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III

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature ofthe Case

Plaintiff-Appellant Steven B. Cummings ("Cummings" or "Appellant") brought this
action against Roger L. Stephens ("Stephens"), seeking to find him personally liable for his
conduct related to Cummings' purchase of real property from the Roger L. and Barbara L.
Stephens Family Trust ("Stephens Family Trust" or "the Trust"). Cummings named Stephens as
a defendant, but did not make any reference to Stephens' representative capacity as a co-trustee
of the Stephens Family Trust, nor did he name the Trust or the other co-trustee, Barbara
Stephens, as palties in the action. (R. Vol. 4, p. 574-595.)
The original warranty deed erroneously included eighty-three (83) acres of land located
on the east side of Highway 30 in Bear Lake County, Idaho, which the Stephens Family Trust
never intended to sell. Stephens discovered and complained about the error to Defendant-Cross
Appellant NOlthern Title Company of Idaho, Inc. ("Northern Title"), the title company that had
closed the sale of the propelty and issued title insurance. NOlthern Title modified the legal
description to exclude the propelty east of Highway 30 from the transfer, then re-recorded the
original deed as a correction deed with the modified legal description.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Cummings asselted claims against Stephens for
breach of warranty, conversion and slander of title, all of which rely solely upon allegations that
Stephens had altered the deed or recorded a new deed after the initial transfer. (Id. at pp. 58587.)

Cummings did not allege any claims for specific performance or to quiet title, yet he

requested in his prayer for relief that Stephens be estopped from conveying the property to any
other party and that the court deem the entire property conveyed to Cummings.] (Id.)
At the close of Cummings' case-in-chief at trial, the district court dismissed all claims
against Stephens because there was no evidence that Stephens altered or recorded the correction
deed or did anything wrong, and because Cummings had abandoned any claim to recover the
actual property at trial. The district COUIt also recognized that Cummings had not named the
Trust or the co-trustee as parties in the action, and that Stephens was sued only in his individual
capacity, and thus the court could not enter an order affecting title to the propelty.
On appeal, Cummings asks this COlllt to conclude that he is the rightful owner of the
eighty-three (83) acres on the east side of the highway. Stephens respectfully submits that the
district COUlt'S dismissal of Cummings' claims should be affirmed.

B.

Course of Proceedings Below

Stephens is generally satisfied with the Appellant's description of the course of
proceedings, with the following additions:
Cummings moved for summary judgment on August 6, 2010, and Stephens filed a crossmotion for summary judgment on September 22, 2010.

The district COlllt initially granted

Stephens' motion for summary judgment on January 4, 2011. (R. Vol. 1, p. 106-132.)
Cummings fi led a motion to reconsider on .J anuary 18, 2011, in which Cummings
represented that he "will provide evidence to the COUIt challenging the credibility of both Evan
During argument at trial on Stephens' motion to dismiss, Cummings' counsel argued
that estoppel and recovery of the property are potential remedies for the breach of warranty
claim, (Tr. Vol. L pp. 733: 16-24), but he has not cited any authority in support of such assertion.
I
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Skinner and Dorothy Julian, who are the only agents of the Defendant that Cummings had any
interaction with prior to purchasing the property."

In support of the motion to reconsider,

Cummings submitted an affidavit of counsel, to which was attached an "affidavit" of Curtis
Baum, one of the owners of Three Bar Ranch. (R. Vol. 2, p. 1911 Three Bar Ranch originally
contracted to purchase the property from the Stephens Family Trust, but assigned its contract
rights to Cummings. The district court concluded that Baum's affidavit raised sufficient issues
of fact that would preclude summary judgment. The court expressed, however, that Baum's
presence at trial would be necessary, otherwise there would insufficient evidence to find in
Cummings' favor:
So I'm going to grant the motion to
THE COURT:
reconsider. I'm going to put this back on the court trial calender
(sic). It's still a court trial. I just hope we're not spinning wheels
here. And I hope Dr. Baum can come in.
Because without him, I think you're going to lose unless there's
some other way to get that evidence in.

***
.... I'm just saying that the thing that's tipping my mind today is
Dr. Baum's affidavit.
MR. OLSEN: Got it. Okay.
THE COURT: And without that coming in with proper foundation,
you're going to have a tough time meeting what you need to meet
here, the burden of proof here.
(Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 965:22-966:2, 966:11-17.) In the court's Minute Entry and Order filed after the
hearing, the district court further explained: "The Court informed counsel that the affidavit of Dr.
Interestingly, the affiant resides in Russia but his "affidavit" was notarized in Idaho
Falls, Idaho.
2
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BaUln is not admissible at trial. Plaintiffs counsel stated they would find Dr. BaUln and have him
testify at tria!." (Augmented Record, Minute Entry and Order, dated March 17,2011, p. 2.)
At trial, Baum was not called as a witness. The district court granted Stephens motion to
dismiss pursuant to IRCP 41 (b) after Cummings closed his case-in-chief. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 735737.)

Later, after trial, in its decision awarding attorney fees to Stephens, the district court

discussed its prior decision to grant Cummings' motion to reconsider, and Cummings' failure to
produce Baum as a witness at trial:
Stephens prevailed on summary judgment only to be brought back
into the case on Cummings' motion to reconsider based upon
Cummings' representation of newly discovered facts to be
presented by a lay witness. The Court made it very clear that the
only reason it granted the motion to reconsider was because of the
purported testimony of the new witness. At trial, the lay witness
did not testify. The facts presented in the plaintiffs case-in chief
did not materially change from the facts presented at the time of
summary judgment. The Court granted Stephens a Ru Ie 41 (b)
dismissal at the close of plaintiffs presentation of evidence.
(R. Vo!' 9, pp. 1803-04.)

C.

Concise Statement of Facts

The Stephens Family Trust owned real property located in Bear Lake County, Idaho,
located on both the east and west sides of Highway 30. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1592, Findings #1 and 2,
and p. 1596, Finding #33.)

Stephens and his wife, Barbara, as trustees of the Stephens Family

Trust, listed only the property on the west side of the highway for sale.

(Id.) The trial cOUli

expressly held that "[t]he Stephens had no intention to sell their property located on the east side
of the highway." (R. Vol. 8, p. 1592, Finding #2.)
4

NOlihern Title understood that only the

property west of the highway was for sale, (id. at p. 1593, Finding #8), as did the real estate
agents, Dorothy Julian and Evan Skinner. (Tr. p. 817:3 - 818:11; see also Julian Published
Depo .. pp. 20: 13-20, 21: 14-17, 36: 15-22, 38: 16-24, and 40: 19 - 41 :3.)
Cummings was traveling through Bear Lake County on July 22, 2007, and noticed the
"for sale" sign at the property, and contacted the listing agent's office.

(R. Vol. 8, p. 1593,

Findings # 10-11.) The property was already under contract to Three Bar Ranches, so Cummings
contacted Three Bar Ranches through the real estate agents and offered to purchase the contract
for $50,000. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1594, Findings #14-15.)

Cummings received a copy of the Real

Estate Purchase Contract ("Contract") on July 26, 2007.

(R. Vol. 8, p. 1594, Finding #16;

Exhibit 8.) Three Bar Ranches executed an assignment of the Contract to Cummings on July 30,
2007. (Exhibit 14.)
Northern Title prepared a legal description for the property, which incorrectly included
the property located on both sides of the highway, and even included land that was not owned by
either the Stephens Family Trust or Stephens individually. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1594, Finding # 17; See
Exhibit 10.)

The error was discovered by Northern Title, and a new legal description was

drafted containing language intended to exclude all property east of the highway. However, the
new description inserted the exclusionary language in the wrong place and thereby also failed to
exclude the propeliy on the east side of the highway. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1595, Findings #25-27; See
Exhibit 11.)
On August 3, 2007, Roger L. and Barbara Stephens, as trustees of the Stephens Family
Trust executed a warranty deed to Cummings, to which was attached the second incorrect legal

5

description. (ld. at Findings #28 and 31; Exhibit 17.) On or about November 8, 2007, Stephens
learned from the county tax assessor when he went to pay his property taxes that the Trust was
no longer the owner of record of the property east of the highway.

Stephens immediately

contacted Northern Title and requested that the error be corrected.

(Id. at Finding #34.)

Northern Title prepared a new legal description excluding all land east of the highway, attached
it to the original warranty deed executed on August 3, 2007, and re-recorded it as a correction
deed. The conected deed transferred only the Trust property west of the highway to Cummings.
(Id. at Findings #35-36.)
Cummings brought suit against Stephens, individually, and Northern Title. He asselied
four claims against Stephens in his Second Amended Complaint, alleging Breach of Warranty,
Conversion, Slander of Title, and Infliction of Emotional Distress. (R. Vol. 4, p. 575-77, Counts
I, II, III and IX.) At trial, Cummings expressly withdrew his claim for Infliction of Emotional
Distress against Stephens, (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 722:2-5.) and the district court granted Stephens motion
to dismiss under lRCP 41(b) at the close of Cummings' case-in-chief. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 735-737.)
In making its decision on the motion to dismiss, the district court found that Stephens never
intended to sell the property east of the highway; that the real estate agents and title company
understood Stephens' intent; that errors in drafting the deed language mistakenly included the
land east of the highway; that there was no evidence that Stephens had altered the deed, but that
he at most consented to the changes in order to comply with his original intent; and that
Cummings abandoned his claim to the actual real propeliy in his trial testimony. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp.
736:17 -737:25.)
6

Later, the district court entered written findings, which confirm that Stephens only
brought the error in the legal description to Northern Title's attention and that Northern Title
acted to record the correction deed. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1596, Findings #32-36.) The written findings
demonstrate that all of the actions allegedly giving rise to Cummings' claims against Stephens
were actually done by Northern Title.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Cummings' failure to bring suit against the Stephens Family Trust or its

trustees precludes any right to recover the disputed property.
2.

Whether Cummings abandoned any claim to recover any real property; and if not,

whether he waived any objection to the district court's conclusion that the claim to recover real
property was abandoned.
3.

Whether the district court's findings and conclusions adequately suppOlied its

decision to dismiss the claims against Stephens; and if not, whether those reasons are obvious
from the record.
4.

Whether the district cOUli correctly granted Stephens attorney fees as the

prevailing pmiy where the claims relate to a commercial transaction and the underlying contract
provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing pmiy.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Stephens requests that this Court award his reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § § 12-120(3) and 12-121, Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, and pursuant
to the Contract underlying Cummings' claims.
7

Pursuant to section 12-120(3), the prevailing

party is entitled to attorney fees in an action "relating to ... any commercial transaction." This
litigation arose out of a commercial transaction for the sale of a ranch to Cummings, which he
intended for commercial use, and thus falls within the meaning of a commercial transaction. (R.
Vol. 4, p. 575-77, Second Amended Complaint ~~ 11 and 16.) If Stephens is the prevailing party
on appeal, he is entitled to recover additional reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal.
In normal circumstances, attorney's fees will be awarded under section 12-121 when the
court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation. Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591
P.2d 1078 (1979); Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563 (et. App. 2009). In this
appeal, the primary relief sought as against Stephens by Cummings is a recovery of the real
property, which Cummings claims should have been transferred to him pursuant to the Contract
with the Stephens Family Trust. As will be further addressed below, however, Cummings had
abandoned his claim to the actual property at trial, which precludes him from seeking its
recovery on appeal. Furthermore, Cummings failed to bring suit against the Trust or the trustees
who actually hold title to the disputed propeliy. His arguments on appeal that seek to obtain title
to the property from Stephens-who has no ownership interest in the propeliy-are therefore
frivolous and without any basis in fact or law.

Therefore, Stephens should be awarded his

attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
Additionally, Cummings' claims relate to the Contract entered between himself and the
Stephens Family Trust. Section 27 of the Contract specifically provides for an award of attorney
fees to the prevailing party if "either pmiy initiates or defends any ... legal action ... which are

8

In

any way connected with [the Contract] . . . , including such costs and fees on appeal."

(Exhibit 8.) Because this action was initiated by Cummings, a paJiy to the Contract and his
claims on appeal are connected to the Contract, Stephens should be entitled to an award of
attorney fees on appeal as the prevailing party.

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This COUli has long held that in a non-jury trial, the trial couli is permitted to weigh the

evidence and resolve conflicts in the evidence in deciding a motion for dismissal under IRCP
41 (b):
[W]hen a defendant moves for an involuntary dismissal at the close
of the plaintiffs presentation in a non-jury case, the court sits as a
trier of fact and is not required to construe all evidence and
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Thus, in rendering a judgment pursuant to the defendants'
motion for dismissal under I. R.C.P. 41(b), the trial court is not as
limited in its evaluation of the plaintiffs case as it would be in a
motion for directed verdict. The court is not to make any special
inferences in the plaintiffs favor nor concern itself with whether
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Instead, it is to weigh the
evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where the
preponderance lies.

Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823,825,606 P.2d 473,475 (1980); Clear Springs Foods v. Clear
Lakes Trout Co. (in Re SRBA Case No. 39576),136 Idaho 761,764,40 P.3d 119,122 (2002).
On appeal, the district COllli's findings of fact made pursuant to an IRCP 41 (b) dismissal
will be upheld so long as they are not "clearly erroneous."

Dep't of Health & Welfare ex reI.

Osborn v. Altman, 122 Idaho 1004, 1009, 842 P.2d 683, 688 (1992). A finding of fact is not
9

·'c1early erroneous" if it is supported by substantial, competent evidence.

ld. The appellate

courts exercise free review of the district court's conclusions of law. Coward v. Hadley, 150
Idaho 282, 246 P.3d 391 (2010).
A district court is required by IRCP 52(a) to make findings of fact and conclusions oflaw
when dismissing a plaintiff s case pursuant to IRCP 41 (b), "[h]owever, failure to state reasons is
not fatal if those reasons are obvious from the record itself." Rudy-Mai Farms v. Peterson, 109
Idaho 116, 705 P.2d 1071 (Ct. App. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When the trial court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, Idaho appellate
courts will affirm the result on the correct theory. Nampa & Meridian lrr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139
Idaho 28,33, 72 P.3d 868, 873 (2003).

II.

CUMMINGS FAILED TO BRING SUIT AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE
PROPERTY
On appeal, Cummings asks this Court to reverse the district cOUli's dismissal of the

claims he brought against Roger Stephens, and to conclude that he is the rightful owner of the
eighty-three (83) acres located on the east side of the highway pursuant to the original Warranty
Deed.

The record is abundantly clear, however, that the owner and grantor of the subject

propeliy was not Stephens in his individual capacity; it was the Stephens Family Trust acting
through him and his wife. Barbara Stephens, as co-trustees.
Exhibits 10, 18 and 19: and Tr. Vol. I, pp. 728:15-729:10.)3

(Exhibits 17 and 22; see also
Stephens does not hold any

3 During argument on the motion to dismiss, the Court recognized that the Stephens
Family Trust was the owner of record and the grantor in the warranty deed. The Court expressed
doubt that it could award the propeliy to Cummings because neither the trust nor Barbara
10

ownership interest in the subject property in his individual capacity, and Cummings presented no
evidence of any such interests.

Therefore, Stephens could not effectuate a transfer of the

propelty in his individual capacity, whether voluntarily or by judicial compulsion.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") require that a complaint designate as a
defendant "any party against whom the [complaint] is filed," and forbids entry of judgment
against a patty that was not served with process. IRCP 3(a). Rule 3(b) requires that any action
against a person in some representative capacity, such as a trustee, "shall indicate the nature of
the representative capacity for which the person is made a patty to the action."

IRCP 3(b)

(emphasis added); Collier Carbon & Chem. COlp. v. Castle Butte, Inc., 109 Idaho 708, 710-711,
710 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Ct. App. 1985).
The trustees of a trust are the proper parties in an action that seeks to affect legal title to
trust property. As a general rule, "[t]he trustee is the legal owner of trust propelty, and as such
the trustee is the proper party for actions affecting title to trust property. Thus, a trustee is a
necessary patty to any suit or proceeding involving a disposition of trust property or funds, ... "
76 Am Jur 2d Trusts § 611 (footnote omitted). See also, e.g., Ruestman v. Ruestman, III
S.W.3d 464, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2003) (same); Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A. 2d 819, 835 (Del.
1957) (same); Bank

(~f

N.y. v. Bell, 63 A.3d 1026, 1031 (Conn. Ct. App. 2013) (same);

Coverdell v. Mid-South Farm Equipment Ass'n, 335 F.2d 9, 12-13 (6th Cir. 1964) (same
regarding Ohio law); Starcrest Trust v. Berr}" 926 S.W.2d 343, 355 (Tex. App.1996) (same re

Stephens were parties to the action, and that the most it could possibly award was Roger
Stephens' interests in the property. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 728:15-729:10.)
II

Texas law). Recently, in the context of a deed of trust, this Court held that because legal title to
property passed to the trustee, the trustee must be joined in the action in order to affect legal title.

See Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, _

Idaho _ , 302 P.3d 18, 24-25 (2013) ("[AJ lienor

seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against property encumbered by a deed of trust must name
the trustee of the deed of trust ... to give effect to the mechanic's lien against subsequent holders
of legal title."). The property interests of the trustee(s) for an intervivos trust, as in this case, is
materially indistinguishable from those of a trustee under a deed of trust, as in Parhvvest. In both
instances, the propeliy is being held in trust for the beneficiaries. Therefore, the trustees of the
Stephens Family Trust are the proper parties in an action seeking to alter title to the real property
being held in trust.
Neither the original complaint, nor the first or second amended complaint in this case
make any reference to the Stephens Family Trust or to Stephens' capacity as a trustee, nor is any
other defendant alleged to be a trustee

CR.

Vol. 4, pp. 574-95.) The Warranty Deed and other

documents clearly reflect that the Stephens Family Trust is the property owner and seller.
(Exhibits 10, 11, 17, 19 and 20.) Cummings' failure to name the Trust or trustees as a pmiy is
fatally defective to any claim to recover real propeliy. In Collier Carbon, suit was brought
against the defendants only in their capacity as trustees, but they had not been named as pmiies
in their individual capacity.

The personal judgment entered against them as individuals was

declared void by the COUli of Appeals, holding that the trial court never obtained jurisdiction
over the defendant trustees in their individual capacities. Collier Carbon, 109 Idaho at 710-711,
710 P.2d at 620-21. The present case is no different, only in the inverse. Even though Stephens
12

was named individually, he was not named or indicated as the trustee. Therefore, the district
court correctly concluded that it never obtained jurisdiction over the Stephens Family Trust or
over Stephens in his capacity as the trustee. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1635, Conclusion #38.) Lacking such
jurisdiction, the district court could not enter any judgment against the Trust, and thus could not
grant ownership of the Trust's property to Cummings. ICRP 3. (Id.)
Furthermore, even if Roger Stephens were somehow deemed to be joined in his
representative capacity, Cummings could not have secured the change in title to the Trust's real
property without joining both trustees. Cummings wholly failed to name Barbara Stephens as a
defendant in any capacity, despite the fact that she had executed both the Contract and the
wan'anty deed as a trustee. The district cOUli concluded that such failure to sue the proper parties
was fatal to his ability to rescind the corrected warranty deed. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1629-30.) In Walter
E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 539,

546,916 P.2d 1264, 1271 (1996), this COUli held that a co-trustee could not transfer property of
the trust without the consent of the other co-trustee:
Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that cotrustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g.,
Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601,606,45 L. Ed. 1021,21 S. Ct. 737
(1901) (recognizing the principle that "co-trustees may not act
independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the
management of the trust"); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v.
Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (Mont. 1935) (stating "it
is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the
common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficienC);
Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610,53 P.2d
678, 682 (Okla. 1936) (holding that "co-trustees cannot act
independent of one another, and the disagreement between the
trustees in this case renders the act of each a nullity"). The
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principle that two trustees must exercise trust powers unanimously
can also be inferred from I.e. § 68-109(a) which provides that
"any power vested in 3 or more trustees may be exercised by a
majority .... "

ld.

Cummings' failure to name co-trustee Barbara Stephens as a party in this action thus

precludes him from obtaining any relief with regard to a transfer of the trust's real propeliy.
Ultimately, Cummings did not bring suit against the owner of the property he seeks to
obtain through this appeal. His failure to do so is fatal to his claim to the real property.

III.

CUMMINGS ABANDONED HIS CLAIM TO THE REAL PROPERTY
At trial, Cummings abandoned any claim to recover the eighty-three (83) acres on the

east side of Highway 30; yet on appeal, he asks this Court to conclude that he is the owner of that
property.

Cummings' Second Amended Complaint alleged claims against Stephens only for

breach of warranty, conversion and slander of title. He did not allege any claims for specific
performance or to quiet title.

CR.

Vol. 4, pp. 574-95.) As explained by his attorney during trial,

Cummings was relying on his claim for breach of warranty as the basis for recovering the
property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 733:16 -734:20.)
At triaL Cummings initially testified that he was seeking the benefit of his bargain. (Tr.
Vol. 1, p. 138:7-12.) Cummings' counsel later acknowledged that this same testimony regarding
the benefit of his bargain could be construed two ways, as either asking for damages to
compensate for the lost propeliy or as asking for the propeliy back. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 735:1-10.)
On cross-examination, Cummings clarified that he was only seeking damages under the title
insurance policy, not a judgment granting him title to the subject property:
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Q:

In your deposition when we discussed damage with you, your comment
was you only want the land. Is that still your testimony?

A:

Not at this point.

Q:

What is your testimony? What is your claim? What are you seeking
from the Court?

A:

For me, 1 would collect on the policy and move on with my life.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 335:7-14) (emphases added).
At the conclusion of Plaintiffs case-in-chief, Stephens sought dismissal, which the
district court analyzed under IRCP 41 (b). During argument on the motion, the district cOUli
inquired of Cummings' counsel regarding the cOUli's understanding that Cummings had
abandoned his claim to the properiy during his trial testimony.

Counsel confirmed that the

district cOUli correctly recalled Cummings' testimony, and admitted that the testimony could
reasonably be interpreted to mean that Cummings only wanted to recover monetary damages.
The exchange was as fo11ovvs:
MR. BUDGE:

.. I think from the testimony of Mr. Cummings himself
yesterday, he said, "I don't want the property back." He
no longer wants it. He only wants damages. That's all I
have, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT:

WelL let me ask you,_Mr. Olsen, as far as that issue, which
cause of action seeks the recoyery of the real propertv if
your client's still fwing for that? 1 thought he gave it up
on the stand, too.

MR. OLSEN:

And that's possible. But it is a remedy, you know
- J think it's one of the remedies under breach of warranty,
if I'm not mistaken.
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I think, actually, "the remedy for breach of warranty
is that the defendant be estopped by deed from conveying
that portion of the property wrongfully removed from the
possession to any other party."

***
THE COURT:

... [B]ut my notes showed that when he was on the
stand, Mr. Cummings said, "I don't want that east side
anymore. 1 want monetary damages." And I think he
was speaking specifically of the $850,000 under the policy.

MR. OLSEN:

Yeah, 1 think he said that. And then I also offered
some testimony of "What do you want," you know, the
benefit of your bargain. I guess you could look at benefit
of the bargain as either being - you know, reducing the
amount he would have had to pay without the 83, or you
could construe it as, you know, "Just give me the property
back."
Yeah, but 1 would say, you know, based on Mr.
Cummings' testimony probably leaning more towards,
you know, "Just pay me some damages, and let's move
on." 1 think that might have been his exact 'words,
actually.

THE COURT:

1 think so, too.

(Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 733:12-734:1 and 734:21-735:11) (emphases added). If both the district court
and Cummings' own attorney were incorrect in their understanding of Cummings' intentions in
relation to the property, Cummings easily could have leaned over and informed his attorney that
he did not want to abandon his claim to the property.
ShOJtly after that exchange, the district cOUli made its ruling, relying in part upon its
confirmed understanding that Cummings had abandoned his claim to the actual propelty:
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If there is liability here, that liability lies either with NOlihern Title
or the real estate agents. I do not see where it lies with Mr.
Stephens. And I understand that creates a problem when it comes
to remedies as far as the actual real property itself, but Mr.
Cummings abandoned that remedy on the stand. And I think we're
looking simply here now at monetary damages and how much they
are.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 737:7-13.)

Cummings did not object or seek to correct the district cOUli's

understanding when it was first addressed on the motion to dismiss, nor at any other time during
or after the trial. After trial, the district court issued written findings and conclusions, in which
the court specifically found that Cummings had abandoned his claim to the property and was
seeking only money damages. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1627.)
If the district comi misunderstood Cummings' intent to abandon his claim to the
propeliy, it was incumbent upon him to raise his challenge at that time, not for the first time on
appeal. "A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and later urge his
objections thereto for the first time on appeal." Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d
355, 357 (1982). "A party's failure to object to action by the trial cOUli precludes a party from
challenging that action on appeal." Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866,204 P.3d 504, 506

(2009), citing Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 Idaho 541,544,6 P.3d 397,400 (2000).
In Kirkman, the case was scheduled for a comi trial even though the plaintiff had
requested a jury trial in his complaint, but the plaintiff did not raise any objection to the trial
setting. A few months later during a conference, the trial cOUli commented that it expected to
hold a two- to three-day

COLlli

trial, to which plaintiffs counsel asked, "What do you mean cOUli,

not a jury?" The trial comi responded, "It's been set for a couli trial for a considerable period of
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time." The plaintiff s counsel did not raise any objection, either orally or in writing. When he
attempted to raise the issue on appeal, this Court held: "Kirkman, by failing to object to the
setting of a court trial, failed to bring the issue before the district court and thus did not properly
preserve it for appeal." Id. See also Mackowiak, 146 Idaho at 866, 204 P.3d at 506 (discussing

Kirkham) .
In this case, the trial court believed that Cummings had abandoned his claim to the actual
property, which, even ((incorrect, is similar to the misunderstanding in Kirkham that no jury trial
had been requested. Like plaintiffs counsel in Kirkham, Cummings' attorney questioned the
district court's understanding of Cummings' testimony, but no objection was made to the cou11's
conclusion that Cummings had abandoned his claim to the prope11y. Rather, Cummings allowed
the case to proceed through the rest of trial and then raised his objection for the first time on
appeal. Therefore, as in Kirkham, Cummings did not properly preserve the issue for appeal.
Based on Cummings' abandonment of any property claim and his failure to object to the
district cou11's understanding of his intent to abandon his claim to the prope11y, Cummings
cannot now seek to recover the property on appeal.

IV.

CUMMINGS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS
ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST STEPHENS OR THAT STEPHENS DID
ANYTHING WRONG.
A.

Cummings Failed to Prove the Alleged Factual Basis for His Claims

Cummings asserted claims against Stephens for breach of warranty, conversion and
slander of title.

(R. Vol. 4, pp. 586-87.) The sole factual basis for Cummings' claims are

18

allegations that Stephens improperly altered, revised and recorded the warranty deed, or that he
executed another warranty deed. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 586-87, ~ 50,55,56 and 61.)4
The district cOUli correctly found there was no evidence that Stephens ever altered either
the original or the corrected deed. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 737:2-6.) The evidence is undisputed that
NOlihern Title, not Stephens, prepared and recorded the corrected warranty deed. In its written
findings of fact, the district court correctly found that Stephens had executed the original deed as
a co-trustee for the Stephens Family Trust and later only informed NOlihern Title of the error in
the legal description. (R. Vol. 8, p. 1596, 'i~ 31-34.) The district cOUli found that the changes to
the legal description and re-recording of the corrected deed were done by NOlihern Title, not by
Stephens. (1d. at

~~

35-36.) All Stephens did was bring the error in the legal description to the

attention of N Olih ern Title and request that the error be corrected. The district cOUli recognized
that it could infer from Exhibit 115 "that [Stephens] went to [Northern Title] and said, 'I don't
know how you take care of this, but you take care of it. It's your problem.'"

(Tr. Vol. I, p.

726:9-12.) Cummings' counsel agreed that such an inference could be drawn. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.
726: 13.) Celiainly, Stephens was justified in requesting that an actual mistake be corrected.

Count I for Breach of Warranty alleges that "Stephens breached his covenants to the
Plaintiff in November of 2007 when Stephens altered and recorded a revised warranty deed and
disturbed Plaintiffs' possession of Stephens Ranch." (Id. At ~ 50.) Count II for Conversion
alleges that "Stephens and John Does I-X executed another warranty deed on November 8,2007,
which transferred approximately 83 acres away from Plaintiff back to Stephens," and that
"Stephens took no less than 83 acres of land from Plaintiff without a right to do so." (Id. at ~~ 55
and 56.) Count III for "Slander of Title" alleges that "Stephens and John Does I-X falsely and
maliciously recorded a revised warrantv deed in November of 2007 that slandered Plaintiffs title
to Stephens Ranch." (Id. at ~ 61.) The only other claim alleged against Stephens, Count IX for
Infliction of Emotional Distress, was expressly withdrawn at trial. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 722:2-5.)
4
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In explaining its decision on the motion to dismiss at trial, the district court recognized
the lack of any evidence that Stephens had engaged in any of the allegedly wrongful conduct:
There's no evidence that Stephens altered the deed either the first
or second time. That it was changed, at most, there is evidence
that he may have consented to the changes in order for those - for
the deeds to comply with his original intent.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 737:2-6.) Also, as discussed below, the district court's written findings of fact and
conclusions of law are sufficient to support the conclusion that Stephens was not liable, and
satisfy the requirements ofIRCP 41(b) and 52(a).
Moreover, Stephens could not be personally liable for his actions taken as a trustee on
behalf of the Trust because he was not personally at fault. Idaho Code § 15-7-306 provides, in
peliinent part:
(a) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not
personal Iv liable on contracts properlv entered into in his fiduciary
capacity in the course of administration of the trust estate unless he
fails to reveal his representative capacitv and identifv the trust
estate in the contract.
(b) A trustee is personally liable for obligations ansmg from
ownership or control of property of the trust estate or for torts
committed in the course of administration of the trust estate on Iv if
he is personal Iv at fault.
(c) Claims based on contracts entered into bv a trustee in his
fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership or
control of the trust estate, or on torts committed in the course of
trust administration mav be assel1ed against the trust estate bv
proceeding against the trustee in his {It/uciarv capacitv, whether
or not the trustee is personally liable therefor.
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I.C. § 15-7-306 (emphases added). Lacking any wrongdoing, there is no basis for a judgment
against Stephens.

B.

Cummings Failed to Prove the Elements of His Causes of Action
1.

Breach of Warrantv

Cummings' counsel argued that one of the remedies for the breach of wan'anty claim
asserted against Stephens was the right to recover the property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 733: 16

734: 17.)

"The usual covenants of title are: (1) the covenant to warrant and defend the title; (2) the
covenant of seisin; (3) the covenant of good right to convey; (4) the covenant against
encumbrances; and (5) the covenant for quiet enjoyment." 20 Am Jur 2d Covenants, Conditions,

and Restrictions § 54.
Cummings alleges that Stephens breached his covenants when he allegedly "altered and
recorded a revised warranty deed and disturbed Plaintiffs possession of Stephens Ranch." (R.
Vol. 4, p. 586,

~

50.) As addressed above, however, the district court concluded that Cummings

failed to prove any facts to suppOli his allegations. Because there was no evidence that Stephens
had altered the deed or signed any new deed, nor any evidence that he did anything else
improper, Cummings failed to prove the alleged basis for any of the relief he sought against
Stephens, including a recovery of the property.

2.

Conversion

It is well settled that "real property cannot be ·convelied' and there is no cause of action
for the conversion of real property. Conversion in the legal sense applies only to personal
propeliy.'· Rmve v. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747, 750, 518 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1974). Cummings' cause of
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action for conversion is pleaded specifically and solely against Stephens for conversion of real
property. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 586-87,

~

53-58.) Therefore, there was no factual basis upon which

Cummings could have prevailed on his claim against Stephens for conversion because real
property cannot be "converted."
3.

Slander of Title

"Slander of title requires proof of four elements: (1) publication of a slanderous
statement; (2) its falsity; (3) malice; and ( 4) resulting special damages." Weitz v. Green, 148
Idaho 851, 862, 230 P.3d 743, 754 (2010). "In a slander of title action, unlike actions for
personal slander, plaintiff retains the burden of establishing the falsity of the publication."
Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 760, 572 P 2d 861,863 (1977). In its written decision after

trial, the district court explained its reasons for concluding that Cummings failed to prove slander
of title against Northern Title. One of those reasons was a lack of falsity. The lack of falsity
applies equally to the claim as against Stephens. The court wrote:
The Court is not convinced that Cummings has met his
burden of proving that the November 8 rerecorded deed is a false
statement. There was considerable disagreement on whether or not
the real estate transaction entered into between Cummings and
Stephens included property east of Highway 30. The Court does
not believe that Cummings has sufficiently met his burden in
proving that the transaction did in fact include property east of
Highway 30. Since the real estate deal did not include property east
of Highway 30, the rerecorded deed that excluded property on the
east side of Highway 30 is not a false statement.
Cummings has failed to show that the November 8, re-recorded
deed is a false statement, and therefore his claim for slander of title
fails.
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CR. Vol. 8, p. 1599; See also, Id. at 1631, Conclusions # 2-3.)
The district court also concluded that Northern Title was not liable due to a lack of
malice. Malice has been generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of a statement. Weitz, 148 Idaho at 862,230 P.3d at, 754. Malice will not be found where
a statement "although false, was made in good faith with probable cause for believing it." ld.
The district court expressly found that Stephens never intended to sell the propeliy east of the
highway. CR. Vol. 8, p. 1592, Findings #1 and 2, and p. 1595, Findings #27-28.) A finding that
Stephens lacked any malice is consistent, even if he had consented to Northern Title's recording
of the correction deed. Lacking both falsity and malice, Cummings' claim for Slander of Title
against Stephens was properly dismissed.

C.

The District Court's Reasons For Dismissing Cummings' Claims Are
Obvious from the Record

The district court did not fail to make adequate findings and conclusions as required by
IRCP 41 (b) and 52(a), as Cummings asserts. The district court made specific written findings
that:

(l) the Stephens Family Trust owned the property and was the grantor on the deeds, but
that neither the Trust nor the trustees were named as paJiies in this case, (R. Vol. 8, p.
1596, Finding #33, and p. 1635, Conclusion #38);

(2) Cummings abandoned his claim to the real property in his testimony at trial, (id. at p.
1627, first full paragraph);
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(3) the propeliy east of the highway was not intended to be sold, (id. at p. 1592-93,
Findings #1-2,8-9, p. 1595, Finding #27; p. 1599, #2; and p. 1631, Conclusion #2);
(4) the legal description on the original deed did not conform with the pmiies' intent, (id.
at p. 1595, Findings #25-28; and p. 1631, Conclusion #2); and
(5) NOlihern Title acted to revise the legal description and record the correction deed, (id.
at p. 1596, Findings #31-36); accordingly, Stephens did not revise or record an altered
deed.
The district couli's comments at trial in granting the motion to dismiss fUliher state the reasons
for the dismissal. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 726:3
735:22

727:9, p. 728:15 -729:10, p. 733:10

735:11, and p.

737:25.) These findings and conclusions, as well as the others cited throughout this

brief, are sufficient to support the district court's dismissal of Cummings' claims against
Stephens.
Even if the district COllli had not entered specific findings and conclusions pertaining to
the dismissal of the claims against Stephens, those reasons are obvious from the record. When
the reasons for the court's decision are obvious from the record, the failure to cite specific
reasons is not fatal.

Rudy-Mai Farms v. Peterson, 109 Idaho 116, 705 P .2d 1071 (Ct. App.

1985).
Furthermore, this Court can affirm the district cOUli on any grounds supp0l1ed by the
record even when the district court committed error. Nampa & lvleridian 1rr. Dist. v. ivfussell,
139 Idaho 28,33,72 P.3d 868, 873 (2003). The record is sufficient for this Court to affirm the
district cOLlli on several theories, including the failure to bring suit against the correct pm1y, the
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abandonment of any claim to the real property, and the lack of any evidence to prove the
allegations against Stephens. Therefore, judgment was properly entered in favor of Stephens.

V.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO STEPHENS WAS PROPER
Cummings argues that the district coul1's award of fees to Stephens \vas improper

because the cOUl1 had concluded that Stephens was not a party to the warranty deed or the
Contract. There is no requirement in the fee provision of the Contract that the prevailing party in
litigation also be one of the pm1ies to the contract. Section 27 of the Contract provides for an
award of attorney fees to a prevailing party if either party to the Contract initiates a legal action
that is "in any way connected with this Agreement." (Exhibit 8; R. Vol. 4, p. 602.)5 Under the
Contract, Stephens is entitled to attorney fees because (1) Cummings was a pm1y to the Contract
through his assignment from Three Bar Ranches; (2) the action was connected in some way to
the Contract, a copy of which was included in Exhibit A attached to the complaint; and (3)
Stephens was the prevailing party at trial because he obtained a complete dismissal of Cummings
claims against him. (See Exhibits A and B to the Second Amended Complaint, R. Vol. 4, pp.
598-604 and 624.)
Cummings also ignores the fact that the claims he alleged against Stephens are dependent
upon Stephens' status as a party to the Contract and the grantor on the deeds. (R. Vol. 4, p. 576-

5

Section 27 of the Contract provides in full:
If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or
proceedings which are in any way connected with this Agreement,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the nonprevail ing party reasonable costs and attorney's fees, including
such costs and fees on appeal.
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95.) "A party may be entitled to attorney's fees under a contract even if it is established that no
contract between the parties ever existed."

0 'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904,

912 (2008). See also Konic international Corporation v. Spokane Computer Services, inc., 109
Idaho 527, 708 P.2d 932 (Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that no contract was formed but affirming
an award of fees pursuant to the contract); intermountain Forest Mgmt. v. Louisiana Pac(fic

Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 31 P.3d 921 (2001) (alleging the existence of a relevant contractual
relationship is sufficient to trigger application ofthe fees statute).
Furthermore, Cummings' purchase of the property was clearly a commercial transaction,
as he intended it for business use. (R. Vol. 4, p. 575-77, Second Am. Complaint

~~

11 and 16;

Vol 8, p. 1627, #2.) Therefore, Stephens was also entitled to fees as the prevailing party under
Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 259 P.3d 608 (2011).
Cummings argues that the award of fees to Stephens was improper because Northern
Title had agreed to indemnify Stephens, but cites no authority to support this proposition.
Northern Title's indemnification of Stephens' attorney fees is immaterial to whether Stephens is
entitled to an award of fees as the prevailing party.

The indemnification is a contractual

obligation between Northern Title and Stephens, and has nothing to do with Cummings as a nonparty to that contract. Regardless of whether Northern Title was at fault, Northern Title was not
the party who brought Stephens into this action. Cummings chose to bring suit against Stephens
despite the lack of any evidence that Stephens acted wrongfully in any way. Even if NOlihern
Title was the party ultimately at fault-to which Stephens does not concede- it should not be
required to bear the cost of Cummings' decision to pursue unsuppOlied claims against Stephens.
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Regardless of whether Northern Title was assigned the award of fees to Stephens, it does not
alter the net amount Cummings was entitled to recover under the district court's judgment. He
could still recover the damages and fees awarded against Northern Title (but only if he prevails
on the cross-appeal), and he will still pay the fees awarded against him to Stephens. The fact that
the awards of attorney fees will simply offset because of Stephens assignment to NOlthern Title
does not alter Cummings' net award, it only simplifies execution on the judgments. Therefore,
the district court's award of attorney fees to Stephens was proper and should be affinned.

CONCLUSION
The district court's decision should be affirmed for any of four reasons.

First,

Cummings' failed to name as a defendant in this case the actual owner of the property in
question, the Stephens Family Trust, nor did he name Roger Stephens as a trustee or join the
other co-trustee, thus precluding any recovery or remedy against the real propelty.

Second,

Cummings testimony at trial abandoned any recovery of the real property and only sought
recovery of monetary damages. Third, Cummings failed to object at trial when the district court
stated that Cummings had abandoned any claim for recovery of the propelty. Fourth, there was
no evidence presented at trial that Stephens prepared, signed or recorded the correction warranty
deed or did anything wrong, as had been alleged in the complaint.

Therefore, Stephens

respectfully submits that the district cOUIt's decision should be affirmed on appeal, with Stephens
awarded additional attorney fees on appeal.
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